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THE GENESIS OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONISM AND DIFFERENTIATION 
OF MACRO- AND MICROSOCIOLOGICAL PARADIGMS* 
Dmitri N. Shalin 
This paper presents an historical outlook on the mccro-micro 
distinction in modern sociology. It links the genesis of social inter 
actionism and microsociology to the rise of Romantic philosophy and 
attempts to elaborate methodological principles dividing macro- and 
microscopic perspectives in sociology. Six ideal-typical distinctions 
are considered: natural vs. social universality, emergent properties 
vs. emergent processes, morphological structuralism vs. genetical 
interactionism, choice among socially structured alternatives vs. 
structuring appearance into reality, structural vs. emergent direction 
ality, operational vs. hermeneutical analysis. The complementarity 
of the languages of macro- and microsociological theories is advocated 
as a foundation for the further elaboration of conceptual links between 
the two levels of analysis. 
A review of current literature reveals a growing concern with 
the macro-micro distinction in sociology. Among others, Wagner 
(1964), Etzioni (1968), Wallace (1969), Turner (1974), Goode (1975), 
Merton (1975), and Smart (1976) stressed the need for a separate con 
ceptual treatment of macro- and microscopic phenomena and urged 
more attention to the methodological implications involved. This 
task is particularly exigent in view of the little attention given to 
systematic codification of the microscopic perspective in sociology. 
Whereas "macrosociology" has already found its way into the subject 
index of the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 
"microsociology" isconspicuously absent. Still common is the approach 
that equates "psychological redactionism and micro-analysis, . 
psychological and micro-social knowledge" (Etzioni, 1968:50-51), 
and not infrequently, macrosociology and general sociological theory 
are viewed as coterminous. In his article, entitled "Competing Para 
digms in Macrosociology," Bottomore (1975) draws together under the 
name of macrosociology such diverse theoretical orientations as func 
tionalism and ethnomethodology, structuralism and critical sociology, 
Marxism and phenomenological sociology. As a result, the whole 
issue of the macro-micro distinction is dropped, rather than resolved. 
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Interestingly enough, the issue is typically addressed by those 
who do not consider their own main concern microsoc iological. This 
may in part explain why the discussion often revolves around the ques 
tion of whether or not a particular theoretical scheme qualifies for the 
analysis of society as a whole. Such analysis is seen as a specialty of 
macrosociology, while microsociology is associated with the study of 
parts, fragments, and elements of total social structures. The distinc 
tive feature of macroscopic phenomena is said to be their persistence 
over time independently of the variance in compound elements. This 
holistic precept, variously depicted as the "emergent property," 
"Gestalt," or "network" aspect of social processes, is contrasted to 
the study of definitions, subjective attitudes and experiences attributed 
to microsociology 
This line of demarcation is hardly satisfactory„ On methodolo 
gical grounds, the assertion that microsociology deals with the parts 
without explicit reference to the contextual whole is untenable, for, 
as soon as a part is isolated from its context, it ceases to be a part and 
becomes a whole requiring analysis from the standpoint of its inner 
structure. The contrast of mac rosoc iology as a study of total social 
structures and microsociology as concerned with small items of subjec 
tively held attitudes is also hardly illuminating. It should be remem 
bered that Max Weber, whose approach is consistently labeled macro 
sociological, treated Western capitalism as a dependent variable and 
sought to interpret it in terms of the meaningful actions and rationali 
zations held by members of early Protestant sects. Conversely, Durk 
heim's interest in the division of labor and structural sources ofanomie 
precipitated his brilliant analysis of a conspicuously microscopic phe 
nomenon: suicide. A common drawback of the prevailing approach is 
the tacit assumption that these are inherent properties of the object 
itself that make it macro- or microscopic, and subsequently, invite 
distinct conceptualizations. This tenet implies the classification of 
social objects into those marked by emergent properties and less 
enduring microscale phenomena irrelevant to perpetuation of the 
whole. The latter class of social objects tends to be considered 
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secondary in importance to the theory of society. The whole distinc 
tion, then, serves to separate "the 'hard data' of social structure 
(macro)" from "the 'soft data' of individual and group experience of 
social reality (micro)" (Smart, 1976:86). 
The present analysis gives up an attempt to isolate the proper 
object of macro and microsociological analysis as it exists in reality. 
The question to be addressed is how macro- and microsociologists go 
about defining their subject matter and shaping their object conceptu 
ally. It is assumed that both orientations attend to the same social 
reality, but use different sets of conceptual tools and procedural de 
vices to account for social order, conflict, change, action and per 
sonality. The discussion centers on the historical roots of the current 
split into the macro- and microsociological paradigms and attempts to 
illuminate the complementarity of the languages of macro- and micro 
sociological analysis. 
The suggested approach brings into focus the problem of a tran 
sition from the micro to the macro analysis of social systems,. The 
failure of the prevailing approach to resolve this outstanding issue is 
one of the stimuli to the present endeavor. The task still remains 
before us which Wagner (1964:584) fifteen years ago saw unresolved: 
"The task of finding an effective transition from macro-sociological 
interactional concepts to the analysis of macro-social phenomena, as 
formulated fifty years ago by the German sociologists, remains still to 
be done." It should be clear, however, that this paper does not pre 
tend to offer a solution to the problem. Rather, it analyzes the origins 
of the present difficulties, reconsiders the terms in which the problem 
could be addressed, and thus lays some ground work for further analy 
sis. The ultimate end of this project is to contribute to the codification 
of macro- and microscopic perspectives in sociology. This objective 
cannot be fulfilled within the framework of one paper, especially 
because one of its main concerns is historical. As Merton (1968) 
argued so convincingly, the task of theoretical codification is not 
identical with that of historical systematization. Yet the whole 
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division is justified only if there is a clear understanding that one 
concern is a foundation for the other. 
Since Hobbes1 classical solution to the problem of social order, 
sociologists have been accustomed to seeing the solid fact of society in 
macroformations. State, government, laws—such were the various 
faces of the Leviathan, that mythical monster armed with a scepter and 
sword to symbolize justice and coercion. A drastic change in the 
premises of sociological theory had to have occurred before Simmel 
(1950:10) could have asserted that "society is merely the name for a 
number of individuals, connected by interaction" and Ellwood (1907: 
307) could have reasserted that "society is but a broad term standing 
for psychical interaction of individuals." In Ross1 words, 
" 
'Society' 
is, of course, a kind of fiction. There is nothing to it, after all, but 
people affecting one another in various ways" (1901:293). In the same 
categorical mode, Dewey (1930:85) wrote: "Society is of course but 
the relations of individuals to one another in this form or that. And 
all relations are interactions, not fixed molds." Going even farther 
than his contemporaries, Cooley declared: "...The imaginations which 
people have of one another are the solid facts of society" (1964:121). 
Thus the solid facts of society were dissolved into the liquid states of 
precarious intersubjective currents. This shift marks the thorough re 
vision that sociological theory had undergone on the eve of the 20th 
century. Similar changes were affecting various other disciplines about 
the same time when sociology began to occupy itself with the micro 
world. By the end of the 19th century, scholars had shifted their atten 
tion (1) from the macro- to the microscopic world; (2) from mechanical 
to relativist models; (3) from mechanistic causality to pluralistic de 
terminism; (4) from the metaphor of "body" and "organic whole" to the 
image of "field" and "intersecting systems;" (5) from evolutionary 
teleologism to the schemes accentuating contingency and multidirec 
tional ity of change. These metamorphoses reflected the general swing 
in the metaphysical foundation of science from subject-object dualism, 
foreseen by Descartes as a basis of scientific knowledge, to Leibnitz's 
subject-object continuum and Romantic philosophy of the microcosm. 
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According to Descartes, the critical function of the subject 
consists in the removal of the obstacles (Baconian idols) impeding the 
free flow of information from the object to the subject. The ultimate 
source of activity was attributed to the object that informs the subject's 
action and thought. German transcendentalists reversed the scheme, 
assuming that the subject himself must first inform the object before the 
latter reveals itself to the knower. The activity of a subject (sensory, 
cognitive or practical) was held to be constitutive of both the world of 
objects and the world of knowledge. From the standpoint of Romantic 
philosophy, categories of human knowledge—universals and classifica 
tions, concepts and theories—are not only a passive reflection of the 
external world, but are also constitutive of this world. They function 
as "generative devices" in terms of which individuals apprehend their 
universe and, thereby, constantly reproduce it in macro, as an objec 
tive and meaningful whole. This whole does attain a life of its own 
insofar as it becomes independent of the will of a particular individual 
taking part in its daily reproduction. But this independence remains 
chronically problematic. The objective reality is intrinsically tied to 
an a priori system of categories and classifications in terms of which 
individuals treat "things in themselves" as instances of universal 
classes. The world "out there" loses its appearance of natural and 
independent where traditional categories are no longer perceived as 
mere copies of external reality. Once the subject comes to question 
what normally appears to be a priori true, the objective reality betrays 
its reified nature as the world of objectified, fossilized human activity. 
This subject-object relativism was driven to its logical extreme 
by Kant when he asserted that the subject not only gives unity to the 
world of nature, but also generates the maxim of his own conduct that 
should be treated as a norm of the whole community. This view utterly 
diverged from the assumptions of classical sociological theory that 
stipulated that the sacred reality of social contract requires its extern 
ality and essential independence from the will of individuals. The fact 
that power was external was a guarantee of its objectivity and incor 
ruptibility. Correspondingly, the individual was held to be a person 
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to the extent that he delegated the authority over his own action to 
society and acted according to the socially supplied role. In Romantic 
philosophy, the individual is a person because he is an autonomous source 
of actions and innovations. Here the individual actor manifests himself 
as a sovereign, as an embodiment of humanity at large, or, to borrow 
Marx's term, a "species being" (1964:112). 
The Kantian categorical imperative furnished a new outlook on 
the antinomy of the impersonal universe—macrocosm—and the personal 
world of the individual—microcosm. The latter was stripped of its 
traditional idiosyncrasy and irrelevancy vis-a-vis the Leviathanic vast 
ness of the natural and social orders. This romanticist concern with the 
active part played by the subject in shaping his object inspired the 
relativist and hermeneutical orientation in sociology that stressed the 
role of language, meanings and cultural values in the formation and 
transformation of societies. The adherents of the new approach objected 
to the exclusive treatment of social reality from the standpoint of its 
external manifestation. Young Marx's criticism of "reification," 
Husserl's investigation of "natural attitude," Simmel's critique of 
organicist sociology, Weber's and Cooley's analysis of the interpretative 
nature of social action carried into the social realm the romanticist 
criticism of the classical theory of knowledge. The new approach laid 
bare some of the background assumptions of the classical sociological 
theory and rendered problematic what hitherto had seemed to be obvious 
and well established. 
Just as classical mechanics had failed to recognize that the uni 
versal spatio-temporal structure was but an abstraction from the infinity 
of possible frames of reference, classical social theory failed to appre 
ciate that besides a commitment to the Leviathan, to society as a whole, 
individuals are geared to smaller scale groups that may autonomously 
determine actions and serve as an additional source of conflict. More 
over, in a manner resembling relativist mechanics, interactionist soci 
ologists postulated that social facts are not independent of the frame of 
reference by which they are accounted for. Interactionists rejected 
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the classical scheme that attributed to the individual an absolute loca 
tion in the social structure. The universal system of social coordinates 
was replaced by diversified frames of reference relative to which the 
same individual agent could assume different social faces or selves. A 
far-reaching implication of this relativist outlook was the abandonment 
of the classical postulate of the independence of social structure from 
interacting individuals. Social structure was reinterpreted as the pro 
duct of a "social a priori." The self-contained world of social facts 
that "present a note-worthy property of existing outside individual 
consciousness," and persist independently of their "individual manifes 
tations" (Durkheim, 1964:2, 13) was reconceptualized as a process 
of intersubjectively constituted meanings in terms of which macrostruc 
ture is continuously shaped and reshaped. The focus of sociological 
analysis shifted from the question of how society shapes personality, 
how it is internalized by individual actors, to the question of how 
subjectively elaborated definitions are transformed into the facts of 
social structure, or, in Giddens1 words, how "society is created and 
recreated afresh, if not ex nihilo, by the participants in every social 
encounter" (1976:15). 
This interpretation, differs from one formulated by Parsons in his 
article on interactionism. According to Parsons (1968:434), the idea 
of interiorization is pivotal to interactionist orientation in sociology: 
".. .Weber, rather than having to arrive at a conception of internali 
zation—as did utilitarianism, as well as Freud and Durkheim—quite 
naturally took it for granted, on the basis of his general theoretical 
position." The same is asserted about Cooley and Mead. This view 
emphasizes the interiorization phase of social dynamics and centers on 
the question of how society produces social individuals. The exterior 
ization phase of social reality goes relatively unattended by this treat 
ment which does not elaborate on a question equally central to inter 
actionist sociologists: "Howindividuals produce society.11 For purposes 
of the present discussion, I should like to emphasize the dialectic of 
exteriorization and interiorization, objectivation and disobjectivation, 
as a constituent feature of early interactionist analysis. This dialectic 
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can be seen in the young Marx's interactionist view of social reality as 
objectified activity and his treatment of the inner world of man as a 
realm of meanings extracted from the objects shaped by the activity of 
preceding generations. It can be found in Weber's deep concern with 
the objectification of charismatic explosions in the organizational 
structure of bureaucracy. It is at the very core of Simmel's vision of 
the life process as a continuous creation and negation of social forms 
in which the human spirit grasps its meaning. It is unmistakable in 
Mead's view of an exchange between self and society: "Human society 
...does not merely stamp the pattern of its organized social behavior 
upon any one of its individual members, so that this pattern becomes 
likewise the pattern of the individual's self; it also, at the same time, 
gives him a mind.. .And his mind enables him in turn to stamp the pat 
tern of his further developing self (further developing through his 
mental activity) upon the structure or organization of human society, 
and thus in a degree to reconstruct and modify in terms of his self the 
general pattern of social or group behavior in terms of which his self 
was originally constituted" (Mead, 1934:263). 
Central to interactionist sociology is an attempt to overcome the 
traditional dichotomy of personality and institution, to bring into one 
continuum individual and society by considering them as different 
phases of the same process, rather than as separate entities belonging 
to two different worlds. They are meaningless abstractions without 
each other: "The two—social and individual—are only different 
categories under which the same content is subsumed, just as the same 
plant may be considered from the standpoint of its biological develop 
ment or its practical uses or its aesthetic significance" (Simmel, 1971: 
17). 
Interactionists admit, if sometimes only in theory, that individu 
al actions do have macroscopic consequences, otherwise put, that 
these actions are transformed into "emergent properties" in the modern 
sense of the word. Yet they insist that the solid facts of society are 
quasi-independent from individual actors. It is postulated that macro 
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social institutions have their representation in the attitudes, values and 
intersubjectively maintained meanings which, in their turn, comprise 
what Cooley called a "microcosm of.. .society" (1962:144). This for 
mula is consistent with Durkheim's definition of social facts as "ways of 
acting, thinking and feeling;" yet, where Durkheim stipulates, "exter 
nal to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion" (1964:3), 
interactionists contend, "The 'within' and 'without' between individual 
and society are not two unrelated definitions but define together the 
fully homogeneous position of man as a social animal" (Simmel, 1971: 
17). To depict the continuum of macro- and microcosms, a whole array 
of new concepts had to be brought into being, such as social attitudes, 
values, symbols, meanings, definitions of the situation, selves, roles, 
generalized other. What draws these concepts together is that they 
embrace at the same time the two different worlds. On the one hand, 
they are parts of the subject's inner world and characterize the modes 
in which individuals act, think and feel in their everyday life. On the 
other hand, they are referred to as social facts, as patterns of society. 
The two-fold status of these concepts has made them an important ana 
lytical tool. The same status was also the source of a fundamental am 
biguity that marked the history of their usage. Among others, the pit 
fall of psychologism was the most plausible. 
The view that equates microsociology and psychological reduc 
tionism still retains currency. It is consistently advocated by Homans 
who considers himself "an ultimate psychological reductionist" (1958: 
597). And yet, despite the apparent common roots, it seems unjustified 
to align interactionism and psychological sociology. Interactionists 
contended that consciousness was a stage for ongoing social processes; 
however they added the following qualification: "But it is of extreme 
methodological relevance—even of decisive importance—to note that 
the scientific treatment of psychic data is not thereby automatically 
psychological. Even when we use psychological rules and knowledge, 
even where the explanation of every single fact is possible only psy 
chologically (as is true in sociology), the sense and intent of our activ 
ities do not have to be psychological" (Simmel, 1971:32). 
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To avoid the pitfall of psychologism, interactionists look for a 
theoretical scheme that would allow them to describe social process 
from the standpointof actors without thereby losing the perspective of 
a social whole. They search for such a unit that would have its locus 
within the individual and at the same time would codify properties of 
a social organization. Among other variables, social self seemed to 
most closely satisfy these criteria. Paradoxically, interactionists see 
the source of societal unity in the human self, which, being the 
innermost part of the individual, is at the same time "the solid fact of 
society." That is what Simmel seems to mean when he says that "soci 
etal unification needs no factors outside its own component elements, 
the individual" (1971:7). Mead puts the same idea as follows: "The 
organization and unification of a social group is identical with the 
organization and unification of any one of the selves arising within 
the social process in which that group is engaged..." (1934:144). 
By conceptualizing self as a "monad"or microcosm, interaction 
ists solved the problem of psychological reductionism that haunted 
Tarde in his polemic with Durkheim. Psychic and idiosyncratic in their 
content, individual actions, feelings and thoughts were conceptually 
clustered into variables that were not psycho- but socio-logical. 
Social facts were declared to be facts of human self-identities in terms 
of which social wholes are regenerated in the course of daily inter 
action. A "wholeness" ceased to be an exclusive property of a macro 
world and was extended to the microscopic compounds, to the elements 
of a Gestalt. This logical construct is remarkably similar to the one 
worked out in microbiology. Although the latter deals with molecular 
and chemical substances, it organizes them into "microcosmic11 wholes 
whose meaning is informational, i.e., they codify the macroscopic 
(biological) properties of the entire organism and through them are 
linked to the evolutionary process. Along these lines, we mayconsider 
Weber's assertion that "such concepts as 'state,' 'association,' 'feudal 
ism,1 and the like, designate certain categories of human interaction. 
Hence it is the task of sociology to reduce these concepts to 'under 
standable' actions, that is, without exception, to the actions ofpartic 
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ipating individual men" (Gerth and Mills, 1946:55). Weber's interest 
in the symbolic meaning of mundane activity, his analysis of Western 
capitalism from the standpoint of symbols and definitions introduced by 
the members of the Protestant sects were not reductionist but micro 
scopic. In a sense, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
is a genuine example of a microscopic approach toward the study of 
total social structures in terms of their genetical codes as embedded in 
socially structured matrices of meaning. 
However revolutionary the early interactionist statements seemed 
against a background of social organic ism and its Hegelian archetype— 
Absolute Mind incorporated into a state, they were too general to deal 
satisfactorily with the Leviathanic facets of social life. Weber's 
analysis in The Protestant Ethic was admittedly a preliminary study to 
be supplemented by the macroscopic, economic interpretation, as 
Weber himself made clear. This intention, however, was not fully 
implemented. As a result, many perplexing methodological problems 
of transition from the macro- to the microscopic level of analysis re 
mained unanswered.^ The subsequent development led to the growing 
differentiation of sociological theory into the two competing branches. 
One of the approaches followed Durkheim's definition of sociology as 
"the science of institutions, of their genesis and of their functioning" 
(1964:1vi). The proponents of the other approach argued that "social 
science cannot remain on the surface of social becoming, where cer 
tain schools wish to have it float, but must reach actual human experi 
ences and active social reality beneath the formal organization of 
social institutions..." (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1958:1883). Macro 
sociologists insisted on studying social reality in its external manifesta 
tions. They preferred to deal with the readily identifiable products of 
social activity apart from the precarious meanings that individuals may 
associate with them. Microsociologists objected to this analysis on the 
grounds that it mistakes the reified forms of social reality for the living 
process of an everyday construction of the social world by self 
conscious actions of individuals. This discrepancy in the focus of 
sociological analysis resulted in a progressive dichotomization of 
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structure arid interaction, institution and definition of the situation, 
role and self-identity. Macrosociology came to be increasingly iden 
tified with the study of social structures, formal organizations and 
societies, whereas microsociology was confined to the investigation of 
situational encounters, definitions of the situation and selves. This 
differentiation was accompanied by a typification of the opponents' 
position. Interactionists reprimanded macrosociologists for talking in 
a reified mode, for the loss of humanistic perspective and unreflexive 
methodology, whereas macrosociologists criticized their opponents for 
the lack of conceptual clarity and experimental rigor. 
The objective of the following analysis is to examine more closely 
these typifications. What I will try to do in the remainder of this paper 
is to amplify some of the characteristics of the straw men set up for 
heuristic purposes. It should be clear that the two sets of theoretical 
premises contrasted below as elements of macro- and micro 
sociological paradigms are ideal-typical constructions and therefore 
need not be used by the two distinct groups of sociologists. Symbolic 
interactionism, Goffman's dramaturgical analysis, ethnomethodology 
and phenomenological sociology are diverse theoretical orientations 
with distinct conceptual frameworks and research programs. The 
present analysis stresses what they allegedly have in common as non 
reductionist variants of microsoc iology and contrasts them to equally 
disparate forms of macro-structural and structural-functional analysis. 
Such an approach is not in itself unproblematic. It poses the ancient 
methodological problem of universals and particulars. The question is 
how we go about assigning particulars (particular theorists) to the uni 
versal classes (types of theory) when neither of them can be exhaus 
tively subsumed under the logically exclusive categories. This is where 
the differences between macroscopic and microscopic, structural and 
interactional, classical and relativist visions of society begin, and 
where we start our analysis. 
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Natural vs. social universality. In historical perspective we 
can isolate two major positions with regard to the status of collective 
nouns: realism and nominalism. Realistic tradition views universals as 
nonmental wholes, existing in nature independently of the particular's 
awareness of its membership in a class. Individual particulars, com 
posing any given class, are said to "share" objective qualities inherent 
in their nature. The scientific mind apprehends what is common to a 
class of particulars. The latter are treated as "instances of" or indi 
vidual "existences" of universal essences. Characteristic of languages 
of realism is that universals serve not only as predicates of individual 
things (something is red) but are also allowed "to function in the sub 
ject places of sentences" (redness has an instance) (Brandt, 1971:25). 
The radical version of realism is Platonism. According to Plato, uni 
versals are real things, entities structured into a perfect pattern, 
whereas empirical objects are shadows, imperfect copies necessitated 
by the originals. In a more moderate, Aristotelian version, universals 
are immanent properties of natural things, and as such are denied the 
status of independent entities. 
In the domain of social science, the realistic tradition is con 
tinued by those who insist that social universality closely approximates 
the natural one, and should be treated in the same way. The sociolo 
gist is urged to detect objective interests, common positions, behavioral 
patterns that persist independently of the subject's attitude toward them. 
These common properties provide a basis for assigning particulars to the 
classes, such as Workers, Southerners, Protestants, etc. After univer 
sals have been formed, they are likely to be turned into subjects and 
accorded the status of independent agencies: "Armies and churches, 
tribes and classes, these are the actors of the social world. To under 
stand history or society, these giants and their interactions must be 
studied" (Etzioni, 1968:41). The language of realism has the advantage 
that it allows formulation of new statements and predictions which can 
not be derived from direct observation. The trouble is, however, that 
to test assertions about the class of particulars, sociologists must get 
down to the properties and behaviors of particulars themselves. Yet, 
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more often than not, empirical particulars enlisted for the test fail to 
fit the nomothetical ly generated categories and to act consistently as 
instances of classes to which they allegedly belong. Rather, they 
"spill over" the classificatory borderlines, showing their "multiple 
group affiliation" (Simmel, 1955). This haphazard behavior of social 
particulars casts a long shadow on the "universality" of social classes. 
As Wittgenstein (1965:17) noted, in "our craving for generality" we 
tend to forget that particulars need not to have anything inherent in 
their nature to form a class. It is enough that they are treated as be 
longing to a class, or to put it in language more familiar to sociolo 
gists, except that they are not we. 
Nominalists reject the view of universality as inherent in the 
nature of particular things. The radical theory, attributed to the 
medieval philosopher, Roscelin, denies the objective status of univer 
sal and treats them as "mere sounds" standing for distinct empirical 
objects. Peter Abelard advanced a moderate version of nominalism. 
For Abelard, universals are "meaningful names" whose objectivity is 
to be found in their meaning,, In more recent nominalist renderings, 
universals are held contingent upon human activity which imposes 
common names on particulars. The latter form a class in so far as they 
are treated in a uniform fashion (Mead, 1933:82-90).2 The languages 
of nominalism distinguish "the status of predicates by refusing to allow 
them to occur in the subject place of the sentence" (Brandt, 1971:253). 
A more moderate nominalism allows nomothetic categories but stipulates 
that they are theoretical constructs, "ideal types" that are being sup 
plemented by the "ideographic" inspection of their shaky existential 
basis. As Weber insisted, "In cultural sciences, the knowledge of the 
universal or general is never valuable in itself" (1949:30). Similarly, 
Blumer (1969:148-9) refuses "to clear aside what gives each instance 
its peculiar character and restrict ourselves to what it has in common 
with the other instances in the class" and urges the supplementation of 
nomothetic categories by "sensitizing concepts." In contrast to real 
ists, nominalists are unconcerned with the question of what is common 
in the nature of particular individuals that makes them a member of a 
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universal class, such as "witches," "slaves," "enemies of the people," 
"workers," "delinquents," or "Protestants." The question they set out 
to answer is howthe empirical individuals are identified as members of 
classes through their own defining, classifying activity. 
The nominalist treatment of universals did not enjoy much popu 
larity in the natural sciences, at least not until more recently when 
scholars confronted the puzzling behavior of microparticles that forced 
scientists to reconsider the problem of "class attribution"and identifi 
cation of microobjects. The nominalist problematic was more appre 
ciated in the domainof social sciences. Sociological nominalists view 
properties as "interactional" in a sense that they emerge in the course 
of practical encounters and exist only in relation to the frame of ref 
erence in which they are registered. Universality of social particulars 
is contingent upon the activity of individuals who can literally "share" 
some of their potential properties with others. Individuals collectively 
shape and sustain symbolically invoked meanings. These meanings 
serve as routine frames of typification and self-typification (Schutz, 
1971) for social actors. The distinctive feature of social particulars, 
therefore, is that they can be aware of their membership in a class. 
This awareness is a constituent element of social universals of a new 
order. Universals emerge as socially objective when they are placed 
in diverse individual perspectives of active, conscious particulars. 
Having become an object of the individual's thought and action, 
social universals become subject to conscious transformation by their 
members and nonmembers. Of strategic import for the interactionist 
account of universality is that every particular has many social predi 
cates and shares memberships with real and potential classes, which 
makes the operation of class identification critically important. 
Ethnomethodologists make specifically problematic the social act of 
assigning particulars to a class. Their concern with accounting prac 
tices, by means of which jobless applicants are converted into recipi 
ents of welfare benefits, alleged perpetrators into certified criminals, 
and the man on the street into classified case numbers (typified in 
stances) ready to be processed according to standardized procedures,— 
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is an example of the microscopic approach to the emergent metamor 
phoses undergone by individuals in practical interactional settings. 
This preoccupation with the "social art of accounting for things in 
themselves, 
" with "living universals" and multifacetedness of individual 
monads contrasts with the macroscopic focus on natural social universals 
which are treated as emergent properties capable of preserving their 
identities intact amidst changing identities of class-self-conscious 
individuals. 
Emergent properties vs. emergent processes. The distinction 
between macro- and microscopic visions of society can be best eluci 
dated through the double meaning of the term "emergent" which refers 
to both "emanation" and "reoccurrence." The term is used in both 
orientations, though macrosociologists speak of "emergent properties" 
where microsociologists see "emergent processes." Macrosociology 
conceives of emergent properties as a coherent pattern, or a configura 
tion of parts or a network of interactions that does not oscillate over a 
certain period of time regardless of the variation in compound elements . 
Mac reformations are immune to situational fluctuations. Their identi 
ties undergo appreciable change over longer (historical) time periods. 
Once formed, a setof emergent properties persists as a body that rigidly 
maintains its boundaries in spite of upcoming challenges. A system of 
interrelated properties comprises a structure which constrains the be 
havior of individuals channeling their actions along socially prescribed 
paths. The accent is on the discreteness and independence of a pattern 
from the microscale actions of individuals. This approach suggests a 
corpuscular image of societal processes. 
Microscopic theory grasps the same phenomenon by breaking it 
down into routine cycles of everyday activity through which emergent 
properties are constantly regenerated and accomplished. The micro 
scopic approach attends to the periodicity of social processes as it 
manifests itself in the quasi-ritual routines of collective actions. It 
attempts to isolate the sequences of rational activity that constitute a 
complete phase of a whole process. Through the continuous cycles of 
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competent performances, individuals reproduce social structures. 
Social classes, groups, systems are said to be "emergent," but in a 
different sense: they never cease to reemerge in the course of appli 
cation of "frames of understanding" (Goffman, 1974:22) used by indi 
viduals to make sense of the ongoing reality. Similarly, ethnomethod 
ologists undertake a systematic inquiry into the production of social 
facts in various domains of social life (Garfinkel, 1967), and social 
phenomenologists endeavor to reduce all social objects to intentional 
operations and unacknowledged (taken for granted) presuppositions 
(Schutz, 1971) in terms of which things (selves) in themselves are ren 
dered meaningful, i .e., amenable to practical manipulations. These 
are theories that attend to the wave-like properties of social life. We 
may say that microsociology deals with interactional or emergent (in 
the sense of recurrent) aspects of social structures, while macrosociology 
centers on structural or emergent (in the sense of invariable) aspects of 
an ongoing social activity. 
Taking one more step in this direction, we may say that macro 
scopic theory conceives of society as a giant mechanism of interacting 
social bodies (particulars clustered into classes). As a member of social 
groups, the individual shares with others certain values. He plays his 
roles, and thus contributes to the welfare of these groups. The group 
membership has here a connotation close to the original meaning of the 
word "member"—an organ or part of the whole organism: "„..His 
[individual's] nature is, in large part, to be an organ of society, and 
his proper duty, consequently, is to play his role as an organ" (Durk 
heim, 1964a:403). It is a distinct, externally identifiable attribute of 
the actor which does not vary throughout the time of the individual's 
effective membership. It is stressed that the roles the individual is 
expected to play as a member of different groups may contradict each 
other. Yet the reality of these roles can be established independently 
of whether or not the individual is aware of them. The actor changes 
his roles and group memberships during his life career, but his location 
within the social structure at any given moment is not problematic. 
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A microsociologist grounds his theory in the precept that there 
are more groups, both primary and secondary, in any given society 
than there are individual members. The image of society implied in 
this observation is that of a "field." The key characteristic of the 
logical construct denoted by this word is that each element of a field 
is held to be constituent of various bonds, and as such, cannot be 
unambiguously located in any one particular field. The individual 
particulars are converted into each other and take each other's places 
in various fields to show many faces at once. Drawing on this model, 
^ 
we can say that a symbolic core generates around itself a field to which 
individuals variously gravitate. The properties of a social field, its 
ability to produce "corpuscular effect" vary in time. Individuals 
periodically enter and leave any given field, bring forth and withdraw 
their commitments, assume responsibilities and evade them, deliver 
their actions personally and delegate them to others, and, above all, 
simultaneously participate in other often competingchains of col lective 
actions. Viewed in this perspective, social groups, classes and societies 
lose their "impenetrability." The idea of boundaries, that distinguish 
the inside of a social group (its members) from the environment 
(nonmembers)—changes its meaning in micro-analysis. For the bound 
aries turn out to be inside individuals: they serve to separate different 
faces of the same self. ".. .The individual can never stay within a unit 
which he does not at the same time stay outside of, that he is not 
incorporated into any order without also confronting it" (Simmel, 
1971:15). Macroscopic theory treats the social group as given, as a 
readily observable aggregate or unit. In microscopic perspective, 
social group is more likely to be a variable. Whereas the former 
approach assumes that it is a group that directs the conduct of its 
members, the latter implies that individual actions can produce a 
macroscopic or "group-like" effect. A group is held to be an emergent 
process of individual perspectives converging around a symbolic nucleus. 
A search for self-identity is at the same time the search for class 
identity. And the more effectively individuals are stripped of some of 
their social predicates in favor of others, the more salient is the result 
ant "corpuscular" effect. Taken in their objectified forms, social fields 
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present themselves to social actors as social bodies. Seen through the 
prism of microsociology, the body of society manifests itself as an 
ocean of interferential I y overlapping social fields initiated through 
prophecies, charismatic appeals or routine enterprises that form 
meaning-clusters and interpretation schemes, around which chains of 
collective actions evolve. 
Morphological structuralism vs. genetical interactionism. The 
image of "Gestalt" is more likely to crop up in the writings of macro 
sociologists. But it can also be met in the works of Simmel, Schutz 
and Goffman. The original meaning of this term was closely associated 
with the neo-Kantian revision in philosophy. It referred to the subject 
object relation and denoted an abstraction formed by the subject who 
selects some of the elements of the surrounding field and organizes 
them into a pattern. In this sense the term was employed in Gestalt 
psychology (Kohler, 1947). Macrosociologists do not address them 
selves directly to the active part that the individual consciousness 
plays in the formation of Gestalts. They view Gestalts as essentially 
nonmental entities independent of the rational, purposive action of 
individuals. Macrosociologists insist that behavior of social bodies is 
irreducible to behavior of individuals and urge direct treatment of 
"societies, their components, and their combinations as distinct phe 
nomena whose variance cannot be explained satisfactorily on the basis 
of properties and relations of lower level units... 
" 
(Etzioni, 1968:47). 
The macroscopic approach is morphological. It depicts society as a 
macrostructure composed of hierarchically organized units. Units of a 
higher level provide a contextual setting for the functioning of the 
lower level units. The quality of being "whole" is meaningful only in 
the unit's relation to its parts. At the same time parts play the role of 
a "function" vis-a-vis their contextual whole. 
The microscopic approach follows the line of argumentation ad 
vanced by Simmel (1971) in his classical statement on "How is society 
possible?" This is essentially Kantian solution. It is based on the 
assumption that patterns or forms of knowledge (and action) are tran 
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scendental, i.e., they transcend every individual experience or are a 
priori (a specifically Kantian way of saying that something is socially 
derived) and are at the same time individually appropriated and re 
conceived. To put this in language of modern parlance, the properties 
of Gestaltare codified by its genetical code or frame of understanding. 
The social structure is continuously regenerated by the individuals who 
keep subsuming diverse content of empirical reality under the limited 
set of social categories. This process of interpretatively generating 
social reality is not automatic. There is typically more than one frame 
available in terms of which individuals can "beat the sense out of 
reality." The interpretation of any particular case or setting is a 
product of negotiation. Through the process of negotiation individuals 
establish or challenge the status of social reality as objective and 
meaningful. Interpretative codes should not be identified with parts 
or elements of social structure. They are "informational microwholes" 
that program the larger social act. A carrier of a code is a social 
individuum. In Simmel's words, ". . .The unity of society.. .is directly 
realized by its own elements because these elements are themselves 
conscious and synthesizing units" (1971:7). 
The distinction between morphological structuralism and genet 
ical interactionism is well known in various social disciplines. It is 
found, for example, in the division between structural linguistics, 
that which depicts language from the standpoint of its morphological 
parts irreducible to their individual uses , and generative grammar, 
that which seeks to uncover genetical codes and deep structures as 
they are revealed in the competent language user's behavior. The 
gist of the latter approach "lies in its central emphasis on the 'creative' 
aspect of the language user's ability to produce novel sentences he 
never uttered or heard before" (Greene, 1972:17). A similar distinc 
tion exists in anthropology and depth psychology. The latter attempts 
to account for macroscale behavior in terms of the paradigm-setting 
conflicts a child has suffered in the formative stages of its growth. 
Morphological structuralists work on what linguists would call the 
"language level" of analysis. They are preoccupied with the virtual 
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states of the system. Genetical interactionists are concerned with the 
"speech level" of investigation and eventual states of the system: 
language insofar as it becomes an event in particular interactional 
settings (Ricoeur, 1978:109-19). Macrosociologists are aware that 
normative rules are routinely violated, that, say, the 55 mile an hour 
speed limit is observed by some 50% of the car drivers. But they con 
sciously concentrate on the syntactical rules which comprise a system 
of constraints limiting behavioral options. Genetical interactionists 
investigate how virtual systems are eventualized through practical 
negotiations (hence, Goffman's interest in the "backstage" of Parsons' 
social system). When studying the phenomenon of bureaucracy, the 
macrosociologist would first delineate a set of formally designated 
offices, an official hierarchy of authority, a system of rules and 
instructions regulating the relationships between offices, and a set of 
criteria for appointments to the office. The objective of the macro 
scopic analysis is then to demonstrate how observable behavior fits (or 
is necessitated by) the structure of analytically elucidated components 
of a bureaucratic organization. A microsociologist, setting out to 
analyze the phenomenon of bureaucracy, could conceptualize it as a 
bureaucratic mode of production of objective reality. He would con 
cern himself with the interpretative practices by means of which un 
classified reality of case numbers is organizationally processed into an 
objective social reality of "facts" and "data." The reality of formal 
organization is then systematically described from the standpoint of 
how it is routinely generated and enforced by the individuals who are 
authorized to interpret, label and classify a social being as rational 
and orderly. 
Choice among socially structured alternatives vs. structuring 
appearance into reality. From Hobbes to Durkheim, the proponents of 
macroscopic theories denied to the individual the authorship of his 
action. This powerful analytical device was introduced to describe 
societal determination of individual behavior. The individual was 
seen as a bearer of a social role which is supplied to him in exchange 
for the surrender of his authority (literally authorship) over his own 
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action. The closer is the identification of the individual and his role, 
the more thoroughly are his need-dispositions socialized, then the more 
smoothly the actor functions as a social character within socially de 
fined space. More recent versions of macro-structural interpretation 
of role theory stress the choice among various roles the individual 
faces in practical situations. In his rendering of Merton's theory, 
Stinchcombe (1975:12) conceptualizes social behavior as "the choice 
between socially structured alternatives. 
" Several features common to 
the macroscopic account of social action can be isolated: (1) the 
individual is confronted with ready-made alternatives which are super 
imposed upon him: "But it is important to remember that those doing 
the choosing were the authors neither of the alternatives nor the cir 
cumstances influencing their choice" (Lenski, 1975:148); (2) the 
ultimate source of activity is attributed to social wholes that are seen 
as true actors of the social world; (3) action is consistently treated as 
a dependent variable conceptualized as "role performance" 
[Dahrendorf's Homo Sociologicus (1973) is an approximation of this 
idealizationj. 
In the microscopic perspective, the individual reveals himself 
not only as the actor of a social role, but also as its co-author. 
Microsociologists take pains to emphasize what they consider the dis 
tinctly human alternative available to human beings: introduction of 
new alternatives and restructuring of the existing structure of choices. 
Where macrosociologists seek to show how the action fits the standard 
framework of choices, microsociologists attempt to reconstruct the 
logic of transition from one frame to another with special attention 
given to the emergent definitions, "keyings" (Goffman, 1974)5 of the 
established frames. Microsociologists point out that social norms, 
instructions, treaties are marked by "strategic ambiguity." Any 
system of formally defined rules contains what Garfinkel calls an "et 
cetera clause"or an implicit assumption that these rules are applicable 
to any relevant situation. However, their practical application is 
contingent upon the creative interpretation of the formal guidelines by 
the individuals who continuously adjust conflicting frames of under 
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standing in the light of changing exigencies of the situation. The 
central process in microsociological analysis is structuring perspectives 
for social action. To put it in the more esoteric idiom of micro 
sociology, action is structuring appearance into reality. Subjectively 
invoked definitions are transformed into objective meanings when they 
are taken into account by the participants, translated into their parts 
of social action, and dramatized through their facework as "genuine 
reality." As seen in this perspective, objective social reality is very 
much a phenomenon of "Potemkin portable villages," insofar as this 
reality requires facework and artistic performances for its erection and 
maintenance. An individual actor is deemed to be free to frame the 
situation the way he sees fit (even though he may be held personally 
accountable if his interpretation of reality differs from the officially 
enforced one). Ultimately, it is the "trustworthiness" of the individual 
performances and personal commitments to sustaining "fronts" that 
presents a perennial threat to the established social scenario. The 
performance skills needed for staging social reality are learned through 
the process of socialization. This process is seen not so much as the 
learning of roles, as the learning of codes and skills needed for the 
creation of new codes. Children begin to experiment with the "con 
struction of social reality" (Berger and Luckman, 1966) as soon as they 
are able to communicate. First they play at being someone or some 
thing, and then they engage in collective "games" where they can test 
the limits of collectively defined reality (Mead, 1934). To summarize 
the microscopic view of social action: (1) Microsociologists concep 
tualize social behavior as a creative application of existing models to 
the changing exigencies of the situation. This implies not only making 
new sentences from the old vocabulary, but also adding new "idioms" 
to the established corpus of social meanings. Microsociologists referto 
this aspectof social activity as "conductwhich is shaped by the actor," 
"formative process in its own right" (Blumer, 1969:63, 53), "shaping 
activity" (Denzin, 1969:929). (2) The subject of social activity is an 
individuum. It is through his conscious actions that collective enter 
prises are conceived and carried through. (3) Social action is more 
likely to be an independent variable in microscopic analysis. 
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One important implication of the diverse perspectives on social 
action is the different way in which both orientations account for non 
conformist behavior. Macrosociologists perceive it as "deviance;" 
microsociologists look at it as potential "dissent." The first approach 
seeks to subsume deviant behavior under the category of structural con 
straint. The latter emphasizes its creative potential and unpredicta 
bility. Both views suggest diverse perspectives on social change. 
Structural vs. emergent directionality. The central question for 
understanding the nature of social change is: "How are newalternatives 
evolved in the course of social interaction?" Macrosociology derives 
new patterns from the interplay of the available alternatives. The 
source of this tradition can be traced back to the Hegelian view of 
social action as recognized necessity and his vision of historical pro 
cess as a cumulative growth toward the transcendental goal. Each stage 
of this process is conceived as necessary and is said to be formed within 
the framework of the old structure. The dynamic source of change is 
conflict between different units of society. The historical process seen 
as a whole is a succession of social structures that lawfully evolve ac 
cording to theimmanent logic of societal change,, More recent theories 
avoid the providential istic overtone of these formulations and introduce 
the element of contingency. Social change is conceptualized as a 
process of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization. It is rooted 
in the propensity of morphological parts to develop "functional auton 
omy" (Merton, 1968) which results in the growing disintegration of the 
established social system and its subsequent replacement by a more 
differentiated system. This transformation is completed when the new 
structure of choices is institutionalized. The continuity in the macro 
scopic tradition is manifested in the stress 0) on the convergence of 
development of different societies which are said to pass through essen 
tially similar stages, e.g., traditional, modern, and postmodern; 
(2)on the role of structurally induced conflicts that constrain individu 
als to change their routine paths and to embark upon the new course of 
social action, (3) on the independence of the long-term trends of 
societal transformation from the will of individuals. 
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Microscopic theory sees social change as a result of emergent 
definitions originating in individual actions. Individual actors are 
imbued with an ability to generate spontaneously new meanings and 
symbols that modify the established frames of action. Microsociologists 
attribute similar importance to conflict. They place its source inside 
the individual: ".. .Conflicts arise between different aspects or phases 
of the same individual self..., as well as between different individual 
selves. And both these types of individual conflicts are settled or 
terminated by reconstructions of the particular social situations, and 
modifications of the given framework of social relationships..." 
(Mead, 1934:307-8). Conflict is conceptualized here as a conflict of 
interpretations. It refers to what could be called an "antinomy of 
identification" found in marginal situations where two or more mutually 
exclusive names (identities) are equally applicable to an empirical 
particular. (A hero of the Soviet Union does at the same time happen 
to be a "dissident" and "anti-Soviet agitator," or an Afro-American 
in the late 19th century USA turns out to be the first surgeon to perform 
an open-heart operation.) Social change begins when the individual 
stops considering himself as an instance of customary universals, when 
the old symbols are emptied and new meanings are coined. The latter 
provide fresh grounds for the universalization of action. Those appre 
hending themselves in a new fashion form a community of the "born 
again." This community is based on a universe of discourse which cuts 
across traditional divisions by emphasizing new frames for self 
typification. The emerging social uni-verse (literally one-word, one 
verse) comes alive and forms a macro-whole when it is inhabited by a 
multitude of committed individuals. At the same time, as these indi 
viduals keep reciting their revolutionary verses, the old objective 
reality begins to fade away, castigated as obsolete, apparent and 
doomed to failure. The microsociological paradigm does not have much 
to say about why certain alternatives emerge in the course of social 
development. It is left to macrosociology to reconstruct the logic of 
"natural selection" in societal evolution. Microsociologists are likely 
to proceed on the assumption that mutations of fossilized understandings 
occur randomly within the framework of daily interaction: "Indeed, 
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in countless ways and ceaselessly, social life takes up and freezes into 
itself the understandings we have of it" (Goffman, 1974:563). The 
historical process, as seen in microscopic perspective, could be de 
scribed as a "self-fulfilling prophecy," to borrow Merton's term. The 
prophet is, first of all, an individual with a vivid sociological imagi 
nation. He performs what phenomenologists would call a "phenomen 
ological epoch:" he suspends belief in the present reality and dissolves 
existing social bodies by offering an insight into the "genuine reality" 
behind reified appearances. At any given time, there is a number of 
competing prophecies. Which of them will have come to be "self 
fulfilling" could be established only ex post facto.^ 
To summarize, the microscopic perspective on social change 
suggests that: (1) The individual, as a social being, is an autonomous 
source of social innovations. He introduces new meanings which pro 
vide alternative foundations for universalization of action. (2) Social 
development is an open-ended process resulting from the conflict of 
self-identifications and prophecies. (3) Social change is a multi 
directional and multidimensional process that cannot be exhaustively 
derived from the existing structure of preinterpreted alternatives. 
Operational vs. hermeneutical analysis. The last pair of ideal 
typical distinctions to be considered concerns methodological and 
procedural differences dividing macro- and microscopic perspectives in 
sociological research. The epistemological root of macroscopic tradi 
tion is the principle of subject-object dualism in which Descartes saw 
the indispensable condition of scientific knowledge. This tradition sees 
objectivity as an immanent property of reality to be apprehended by the 
trained disinterested observer. The task of a scientist is to reproduce 
conceptually the ontologically real things and their relationships which 
force themselves upon the unprejudiced scholar. In its positivist inter 
pretation, the Cartesian principle of doubt serves to discard the distor 
tions stemming from the mundane world and impeding the formation of 
a scientific notion of reality. Drawing on this positivist interpretation 
of the Cartesian axiom, Durkheim formulated the first corollary of a 
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scientific sociological method as follows: "All preconceptions must be 
eradicated.. .The sociologist ought, therefore, whether at the moment 
of the determination of his research objectives or in the course of his 
demonstration, to repudiate resolutely the use of concepts originating 
outside of science for totally unscientific needs" (Durkheim, 1964:31 — 
32). The implication of this attitude is the requirement that sociolo 
gists deal with their objects as things and study them in the same fashion 
as natural scientists study physical things. The central assumption of 
macrosociological research is that objects under study are independent 
of the investigator's procedures, or otherwise put, that "his own under 
standing does not enter into the event" (Gadamer, 1976:28). Macro 
sociologists are aware that the researcher's presence can influence the 
behavior of a subject, but this influence is perceived as "noise" to be 
reduced to a minimum. The objective of operational analysis is to de 
tect properties of the object as it exists apart from the researcher in a 
scientific system of coordinates (accounting system). On the basis of 
empirical indicators, a sociologist assigns particulars to analytically 
elaborated categories. Operational definitions specify conditions under 
which a given concept may be said to exist. Scientific classifications 
are expected to meet two requirements: (1) they should be devised so 
that every empirical object under study could be placed unambiguously 
in one of the c lassificatory boxes; (2) the advanced nomenclature must 
provide for accounting of all empirical objects under investigation. 
Marginal cases—where more than one identification is possible—are 
either discarded, or in the case of a questionnaire interview respond 
ents are urged to overcome their doubt and to follow their first inclina 
tions. Mathematical manipulations of the classified cases help to 
establish the relationships between classes of particulars. If the repli 
cation of a research confirms that membership in one class is correlated 
with membership(s) in other classes, such an empirically established 
relationship is judged to be a scientific law. 
The microscopic inquiry follows the tradition of hermeneutical 
analysis. The tradition rejects the view that knowledge can be devoid 
of the subject's presuppositions: "The objective validity of all empiri 
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ical knowledge rests exc lusively upon the ordering of the given reality 
according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, 
namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge..." 
(Weber, 1940:110). Interactionist sociologists assume that reality is 
objective insofar as it becomes an object of human and therefore social 
activity. This means that the process of knowing enters as a constitu 
ent element of the object and that socially generated objectivities are 
a historically changing variable. In other words, objective social 
reality is dependent on the frame of reference in which it is accounted 
for by both lay participants and scientific observers. According to this 
precept, the subject matter of sociology is deemed to be unique in that 
it involves man who meaningfully constructs his conduct. Cooley 
called sociology a "sympathetic or dramatic science" because it entails 
"an imaginative reconstruction of life" (1926:60, 78). Weber defined 
it as an "interpretative" science because "knowledge of cultural events 
is inconceivable except on a basis of the significance which the con 
crete constellations of reality have for us in certain individual concrete 
situations" (1949:80). 
Drawing on relativist assumptions, microsociologists urge atten 
tion to the "generative" properties of human knowledge. They point 
out that social reality is continuously objectified by the individuals 
who apprehend this reality in terms of common sense and scientific 
frames of understanding. Formalized scientific techniques help to 
maximize rationality and control over the reality. But "facts" and 
"data" unearthed by scientific means are ultimately contingent upon 
the questions asked and nomenclatures chosen to make sense of reality. 
Gadamer observes that "what is established by statistics seems to be the 
language of facts, but which questions these facts answer and which 
facts would begin to speak if other questions were asked are hermeneu 
tical questions" (1976:11). Once the search for the immanent meaning 
of social reality is abandoned, the sociologist gives up an attempt to 
eliminate his influence on reality. He treats the "complementarity 
effect" as an ontological condition of human knowledge. His objective 
now is to examine taken for granted assumptions and socially derived 
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nomenclatures used by scientists to reconstruct reality as rational and 
orderly. Cicourel (1974) calls this methodological orientation 
"indefinite triangulation;" this means that "every procedure thatseems 
to 'lock in1 evidence (thus to claim a level of adequacy) can itself be 
subjected to the same sort of analysis that will in turn produce yet 
another indefinite arrangement of new particulars or a rearrangement 
of previously established particulars in 'authoritative,' 'final,' 
'formal' accounts" (quoted in Silverman, 1972:11). 
A hermeneutical perspective suggests an alternative strategy for 
classifying particulars. The latter are treated as self-identifying indi 
viduals whose c lass -membership is contingent upon their class 
consciousness. Through his self-conscious action, the individual 
constantly transcends class-boundaries surfacing as a "particle" of 
various denominations. A microsociologist encourages the individual's 
self-identifying activity. He induces the individual to take as many 
social roles as possible by varying experimental conditions and observ 
ing him in natural interactional settings. To do so, the microsociologist 
becomes a participant observer, a part of the social act which he pur 
ports to study. Of particular interest to mic rosoc io logy are marginal 
cases which provide an insight into the "interferential effect" of the 
overlapping class-identifications. The microsociologist is aware that 
these identifications are a product of a given tec hnique, thatby admin 
istering a test, the social researcher forces his subject to take a stand, 
to assume an attitude which thereby affects the future course of action. 
By expressing theoretically the alleged universality of class interests, 
th e scholar helps to bring them into existence, to make them objectively 
real. The scholar, adopting the microsoc iological paradigm, is likely to 
concur with the microphysicist that the "measuring beam" directed to 
th e microobject detects its properties by shaping them and bringing them 
into existence. 
* * * 
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To summarize this discussion, I wish to reiterate that no attempt 
has been made in this paper to offer a solution to the problem of tran 
sition from the macro- to the micro- level of analysis. What I have 
endeavored is to trace back the split into macro- and microsociological 
paradigms and to isolate some of their methodological assumptions. The 
two sets of principles contrasted above are ideal-typical constructs in 
that they are "formed by one-sided accentuation of one or more points 
of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or 
less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena. . . 
" 
(Weber, 1949:90). None of the particular authors quoted in this paper 
can fitsquarely the designated taxonomical box. Moreover, the greater 
is the sociologist's stature, the more likely is he to look for the synthe 
sis of contradictory principles. To take a paradigmatic case, Marx's 
holistic approach to society as a social organism is inseparable from his 
romantic view of man as a species being and society as a product of 
interaction; "...Just as society itself produces man as man, so is 
society produced by him. Activity and mind, both in their content and 
in their mode of existence, are social activity and social mind" (Marx, 
1964: 137).^ To take another controversial figure, Durkheim's deter 
mination to eliminate "all prejudices" and to treat social phenomena 
as "things" did not impede his discovery of the social origins of human 
knowledge. One could supply numerous arguments supporting theview 
of sociology as a science of the external and reified manifestations of 
the human spirit or favoring hermeneutical analysis of the taken for 
granted foundations of societal institutions. But the most challenging 
task is to understand these two perspectives as inseparable and mutually 
enriching frames in which humans apprehend their being in the world. 
Though not a panacea, the dialectic can be useful as a method 
ological orientation in dealing with the world of relativity and uncer 
tainty. Beyond the current controversies in social theory, we should 
see the age-old antinomies of realism and nominalism, continuum and 
discreteness, determinism and chance, necessity and freedom, macro 
cosm and microcosm. As Kant contended, these antinomies cannot be 
solved once and for all by means of pure reason; and as Hegel and 
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Marx insisted, we should never give up our search for their theoretical 
and practical synthesis. Scientists working in different disciplines face 
similar challenges of the antinomical world. It is in the search for 
their dialectical synthesis that the 20th century scholars came to dis 
cover that corpuscular thingness of mass is convertible into energy; 
that packages of energycan behave as discrete states; that microscopic 
gens forge their way into behavior; that human personality programs 
man's activity; that subjectively invoked meanings are transformed 
into social structure. However contradictory the "corpuscular" and 
"wave" images of society, sociology must meet the challenge by view 
ing them as dialectical rather than as formal contradictions. 
The conflict between different styles and forms of sociological 
thought has a functional implication in that it helps to consolidate the 
efforts of like-minded scholars and thus facilitate a more thorough 
development of the advanced line of argumentation. But pushing the 
thesis to its logical extreme and viewing the antithesis as an inferior 
way of doing sociology leads to a hypostatization of one paradigm into 
the only source of truth. The elevation of macrosociology at the ex 
pense of microsociology results in "sociological corpuscularism," 
"structural teleologism," and in what Wrong (1961) called the "over 
integrated" conception of society and "oversocialized" view of man. 
In the same vein, disregarding the layers of objectivity generated by 
past generations and constraining our path into the future, leads to a 
kind of "sociological wavism," "overemergent" view of society and 
"voluntaristic " conception of man. There is nothing wrong with trying 
to model society after a mechanism, or an organism, or a field, pro 
vided we understand that these are logical constructs. But it is a 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness to insist that society is "indeed" a 
social organism or an emergent interaction. Schutz (1971) warned re 
peatedly against inhabiting our world with scientific abstractions. His 
warning has hardly lost its urgency. 
The progress of macro- and microsociological studies is likely to 
lead to an understanding that meanings are socially structured while 
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social structures are meaningful. Or to put it differently, definitions, 
meanings, presentations of self and face appearances comprise a struc 
ture that persists over time and codifies properties of macrowholes, 
whereas social institutions, organizations, classes and societies are 
constituted by daily interactions and persist as long as they are trans 
lated into meaningful actions of individuals. It took time for scientists 
to learn how to link micro-currencies to the life of macro-physic a I and 
macro-biological bodies, and it may take no less time and ingenuity 
before sociologists would be able to demonstrate how the ossified and 
reified forms ofsocial life are related to the ways people allocate their 
commitments, handle their role distances, manage their appearances, 
and construct their everyday realities. 
FOOTNOTES 
This is a revision of the paper presented at the 73rd Annual 
Meeting of the ASA. The paper is a part of a project on the 
genesis of microscopic and relativist models in sociology that was 
originally begun in 1974, at the Institute of Sociological 
Research, USSR Academy of Science, and continued in the 
Department of Sociology, at Columbia University, after the 
author immigrated to the United States. I wish to express my 
gratitude to Professors Herbert Blumer, Robert K. Merton, 
Robert A. Nisbet, Jerald G. Schutte, Whitney Pope, and to Mr. 
Jay Schechter, doctoral candidate, for comments on an earlier 
draft of the manuscript. 
In the 1930's, the early interacfionist concern with the contin 
uum of social macro- and microcosms was developed by Parsons 
(1937) who attempted to synthesize organic and interactionist 
perspectives on society. His analysis remains perhaps the most 
systematic attempt to link the two levels of analysis to date. 
Without minimizing Parsons' contribution to the problem in ques 
tion, I wish to stress that he views micro-processes through the 
eyes of macrosociology and that his methodological assumptions 
are essentially classical. (See Wagner, 1964, for the discussion 
of Parsons' views on the subject). 
This line of thought was developed by American pragmatism. 
Pragmatists accepted the romantic thesis about the subject's role 
in shaping its environment and translated many idioms of tran 
scendentalism into the language of scientific analysis. Mead's 
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social pragmatism is of a particular interest to the understanding 
of the origins of interactionism because it forms the major link 
between Romantic philosophy and American pragmatism, on the 
one hand, and the "Chicago pragmatism" and the "Chicago 
interactionism," on the other. 
3. It is interesting to note that physicists themselves stressed the 
heuristic value of the concept denoted by the term "field." 
Einstein (1961:450) called it an "incidental concept which is 
indeed a somewhat arbitrary one." The suggested analogy can 
generate sufficient "surplus meaning" when its heuristic nature 
is properly understood. 
4. I would daresay in this connection that Goffman's The Presenta 
tion of Self in Everyday Life is a sociological equivalent of 
Freud's Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Both works pointed 
to the macroscopic relevance of the microscopic occurrences 
and illuminated new avenues for theoretical analysisand research. 
5. Gonos provides an interesting non-interactionist interpretation 
of Goffman's works. He refers to Goffman's methodology as 
"following in its prejudices those of Durkheim" (Gonos, 1977: 
864). Gonos radically separates "situation" and "frame" analy 
ses as incompatible. Yet one could argue that frames must 
be 
situated and situations must be framed, "Framing the situation" 
and "situating the frame" are of equal interest to Goffman. He 
analyzes both processes paying special attention to the question 
of how frames are routinely broken and transformed. If his 
sociology may be called "formalthen it is in a Simmelian, 
rather than in a Durkheimian, sense. 
6. Whether he is a traditional religious virtuoso who claims access 
to the divine providence, or a revolutionary scholar who claims 
to discover the iron laws of social evolution, the prophet insists 
on being a "mere" medium of the forces beyond mundane control. 
What he tends to overlook is that his prophecy is instrumental in 
bringing the new reality into existence. In this sense, the 
prophet does not forecast the future. Rather, he casts the future 
by broadcasting it and thereby supplying contemporaries 
with 
new frames of interpretation in terms of which they can redefine 
and reshape themselves, their action and their future. 
7. Whether or not Marx succeeded in reconciling voluntaristic and 
mechanistic, structural and interactional principles isdebatable. 
But he went further than his contemporaries in trying to bridge 
the gap between classical philosophy and the emerging relativist 
tradition. His search for a synthesis should be continued and 
expanded. 
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8. There is the growing awareness in the present day sociological 
literature that the competing structural and interactionist orien 
tations are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. In 
Merton's words: "Many ideas in structural analysis and symbolic 
interactionism.. .are opposed to one another in about the same 
sense as ham is opposed to eggs: they are perceptibly different 
but mutually enriching" (1975: 31). 
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